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Nancy and Robert Madsen co-owned and operated the Pit Stop Bar & 
Grill in Cushing, Wisconsin from 1979 until 1982, when Robert intentionally 
set the tavern ablaze, destroying the establishment.' Nancy had no prior 
knowledge of her husband's plans, nor any involvement with the arson. On 
their joint income tax return, she deducted one-half of the loss resulting 
from the fire as a loss under Tax Code 5 165: reasoning that she owned one 
half of the property de~troyed.~ The Tax Court, however, could find no tax 
case law or IRS regulations on point, and instead disallo'wed the deduction 
on other  ground^.^ 
Several years after Madsen, Louis Kaplow published an article recogniz- 
ing that Tax Code (S 165, which allows a deduction. for losses, including 
losses from fire, and 5 213, which authorizes deduction of medical expenses, 
constitute a free partial insurance ~cheme.~  The taxpayer's co-pay amounts 
1. Madsen v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1307 (1989). 
2. I.R.C. 5 165(a) (2000) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss 
sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or 
otherwise."). 
3. The parties agreed that Robert c o d l  not deduct his half. Madsen, 57 T.C.M. 
(CCH) at 1308. 
4. These grounds-that Madsen had a "reasonable prospect" of recovery against 
their insurer at the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and hence that the loss might 
be "compensated for by insurance or otherwise3'-turned out to be an empty 
hope. See Madsea v. Threshermen's Mut., 443 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1989) (deny- 
ing review). The case law says nothing more about the history of Nancy and 
Robert Madsen, but there are indications that Nancy might have eventually 
gotten some recovery from the insurance company. See Madsen v. Thresher- 
men's Mut. Ins. Co., 439 N.W. 2d 607,613-14 (Wis. 1989). 
5. Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical 
Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 CAL. 
L. REV. 1485 (1991) (first recognizing that 55 165 and 213 are a type of insur- 
ance and arguing for their abolition) [hereinafter Kaplow, Deductions]; see 
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to  loo% minus the marginal tax rate, with deductibles (in the insurance 
sense of the word) applying to individual taxpayers in some  situation^.^ This 
important insight provides a potential solution for cases such as Madsen, 
where no tax cases or regulations help resolve the issue. In these cases, the 
IRS and federal courts could draw upon the rich and well-developed insur- 
ance case law and s~holarsh ip .~  In insurance law terms, Nancy Madsen faced 
the problems of an "innocent co-insured," which have been addressed by 
multiple courts and  commentator^.^ LexisNexis even has a subject header 
dealing with innocent co- insured^.^ 
Substantial sums of money can hang in the balance. Combined federal, 
state, and local marginal tax rates easily reach 50% for many individuals and 
~ o r ~ o r a t i o n s . ' ~  Without having paid any "premium," taxpayers get this 
also Louis Kaplow, Income Tax Deductions for Losses as Insurance, 82 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1013 (1992) [hereinafter Kaplow, Insurance]. 
6. I.R.C. 5 56(b)(i)(B) (2000) (Alternative Minimum Tax requires medical 
losses reach 10% of Adjusted Gross Income); id. 5 165(h)(i) ($100 limitation 
per casualty for individuals); id. 5 165(h)(2) (individuals must exceed 10% of 
Adjusted Gross Income before deducting casualty losses); id. 5 213(a) (indi- 
viduals must exceed 7.5% of Adjusted Gross Income before deducting medical 
losses). The thresholds in 5 165 do not apply for corporations or individuals 
engaged in trade, business, or for-profit transactions; viewed from a different 
perspective, the deductions are $0. Id. 5 165(c)(i)-(2). 
7. For example, there have been treatises on insurance law since the nineteenth 
century. E.g., ROBERT C. CUMMING & FRANK B. GILBERT, THE INSURANCE 
LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1899); CHARLES FRANCIS MORRELL, IN- 
SURANCE: A MANUAL OF PRACTICAL LAW (Adam Black & Charles Black eds., 
1892). 
8. See, e.g., Williams v. Auto Club Group Ins. Co., 569 N.W.2d 403 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1997); Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 566 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 
1997); Allstate Ins. Co. v. LaRandeau, 622 N.W.2d 646 (Neb. 2001); Michael 
Vincent Laurato, Sr., A Return to Innocence: One Good Reason (Along with 
Several Other Arguments) Why the Extension of Florida's Innocent Co-Insured 
Doctrine Makes Good Public Policy Sense, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 59 (2005); 
C.T. Newsum, Haynes v. Hanover Insurance Co.: Good News for the Innocent 
Co-Insured, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1076 (1986); Leane English Cerven, Note, 
The Problem of the Innocent Co-Insured Spouse: Three Theories on Recovery, 17 
VAL. U. L. REV. 849 (1983). 
9. "Insurance Law > Property Insurance > Innocent Insured Parties." Westlaw 
provides extensive coverage of innocent coinsured law via Key Number 
217k2166 (acts of insureds). 
10. I.R.C. 5 ii(b)(l) (West Supp. 2006) (top corporate tax rate is 35%); id. 5 i(a) 
(top individual rate is.39.6%, with Bush's tax cuts temporarily lowering this to 
35%). State income taxes often add nearly 10% to this top marginal tax rate. 
See FED'N OF TAX ADM'RS, STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES (Jan. 1, 2007), 
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insurance for free, with a "co-pay" as low as 50% applying." Kaplow devel- 
ops models showing how this free insurance discourages many from buying 
private insurance and creates a moral hazard.12 While Kaplow suggests abol- 
ishing $5 165 and 213,'~ this Note accepts the continued political vitality of 
these provisions and argues for using the law developed around private in- 
surance to mitigate these problems and improve the functioning of this free 
insurance. 
Part I of this Note gives a brief overview of $5 165 and 213. Part I1 looks 
at a number of actual and hypothetical tax issues arising under these sec- 
tions and shows how the application of insurance law principles leads to an 
equitable and efficient result. While this approach has great promise, it also 
has limitations. Part 111 examines three limitations of applying insurance 
principles in the tax context and explores what they reveal about the nature 
of $$ 165 and 213. Part IV considers the details of implementing this Note's 
proposals, including its interaction with state law and its statutory basis. In 
light of Congress's current push for additional tax revenues, Part V proposes 
a novel method for the IRS to increase revenues, using a legal tool often 
employed by private insurers: subrogation. 
A, Section 165 Losses 
The general rule of 5 165 allows corporations and individuals to take "as 
a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated 
for by insurance or otherwise."14 This broad language encompasses a wide 
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/ind-inchtml (highest being California at 
10.3%); FED'N OF TAX ADM'RS, RANGE OF STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
RATES (Jan. 1, 2007)' http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/~orp~inc.html (high- 
est being Iowa at 12%). 
11. For a taste of the philosophical justifications behind these deductions, see 
Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 
HASTINGS L.J. 343 (1989). Note that the overall limitation on individuals' 
itemized deductions in 4 68 does not apply to the two sections covered in this 
Note. I.R.C. 5 68(c) (2000). 
12. See Kaplow, Insurance, supra note 5; see also Robert K. Lu, Note, Gross 
Negligence and the Medical Expense Deduction, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1998) 
(showing how barring 5 213 medical expenses deductions due to the tax- 
payer's gross negligence would increase social well-being). Some have argued 
that the entire income tax acts as a form of consumption insurance, See Tho- 
mas J. Kniesner & James P. Ziliak, Explicit Versus Implicit Income Insurance, 25 
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2002). 
13. See Kaplow, Deductions, supra note 5, at 1509-lo. 
14. I.R.C. 5165(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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range of possible losses, and courts have filled in the residual meaning of 
"loss," defining it as an "unintentional parting with something of value"15 
and "some specific, identifiable loss of assets."16 Although 4 165 covers some 
losses for which one cannot traditionally buy insurance,17 it explicitly covers 
many losses against which one can insure, including: theft,'' disaster 
los~es , '~  deposits at insolvent banks,2O fire, storm, shipwrecks, and other 
casual tie^.^^ This Note addresses the jurisprudence around these areas where 
5 165 partially replaces private insurance. 
This free insurance kicks in after the first dollar of loss for corporations, 
partnerships, and individuals engaged in a trade, business, or for-profit 
t r a n ~ a c t i o n . ~ ~  In many circumstances, it prevents the ~api ta l iza t ion~~ over 
many years of a current outlay that does not qualify as an "ordinary and 
necessary" expense.24 Avoiding capitalization can result in substantial tax 
savings to business taxpayers due to  the time value of money. 
Section 165 has more limited benefits for individuals when involving 
property not connected with a trade, business, or for-profit transaction. 
First, taxpayers can only deduct losses beyond certain  threshold^^^: 10% of 
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)26 and $100 "per casualty."27 Second, in order 
McDonald v. Comm'r, 139 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir. 1943); see also J.G. Boswell 
Co. v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 539, 545 (1960) ("[Pletitioner must have suffered a 
'loss' in the economic sense. Bookkeeping entries and paper losses are not suf- 
ficient."). 
B & L Farms Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp 407,411 (S.D. Fla. 1965). 
See, e.g., I.R.C. 5 165(f) (2000) (capital losses); id. 5 165(g) (worthless securi- 
ties); id. 5 165(j) (losses on unregistered bonds); id. 5 165(d) (gambling losses). 
Id. 5 i65(e). 
Id. 5 165(i). 
Id. 5 165(Z). This can be viewed as supplementing FDIC insurance. 
Id. 5 165(c)(3) (which applies to individual taxpayers not engaged in a trade, 
business, or for-profit transaction). 
Id. 5 165(~) (1)-(2). 
Id. 5 263. 
Id. 5 162. Cf: David G. Coolidge, Note, A Square Hole for a Square Peg: Section 
165 and Environmental Cleanup Costs, 14 VA. TAX REV. 779 (1995) (arguing for 
the use of 5 165 to avoid capitalization of remediation expenses). 
These are effectively deductibles (in the insurance sense), but this Note avoids 
the term because of its distinct meaning in tax law. 
I.R.C. 5 165(h)(2) (2000). Note that AGI is a taxpayer's gross income minus 
certain adjustments to income, such as student loan interest, moving ex- 
penses, health savings accounts, and IRA contributions. 
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to qualify, losses must arise from "fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, 
or from theft."28 Courts have interpreted the catch-all "other casualty" un- 
der the ejusdem g e n e ~ i s ~ ~  canon of statutory interpretation. For example, an 
early Second Circuit case reasoned that a negligent automobile crash bore 
sufficient similarity to shipwreck to qualify as an "other casualty."30 In gen- 
eral, courts will only allow an individual to deduct a loss not related to a 
trade, business, or for-profit transaction if it is "due to some sudden, unex- 
pected, or unusual cause."31 Between this restriction, the 10% of AGI 
threshold, and $loo "per casualty" minimum-all of which apply only to 
individuals outside the trade, business, and for-profit context-it is clear 
why Q 165 has the largest benefit for business taxpayers. Since Q 165 acts as a 
form of insurance for all taxpayers, however, the proposal in this Note 
would improve the jurisprudence applying to all. 
B. Section 213 Medical Deductions 
Section 213's deduction for medical expenses-not to be confused with 
the favorable tax treatment of employer-provided health in~urance~~-bears 
many similarities to the Q 165 deduction. Like Q 165, it excludes deduction of 
expenses "compensated for by insurance or otherwise." While Q 165 applies 
to both businesses and individuals, Q 213 applies only to individuals, as cor- 
porations and partnerships do not themselves require medical or dental 
care. 
Just as Q 165 only allows deductions of losses beyond 10% of AGI outside 
the trade, business, or for-profit context, Q 213 only allows deductions be- 
yond 7.5% of AGI.33 Commentators have noted that this free health insur- 
27. Id. $ 165(h)(i). The opportunity cost of not taking the standard deduction, id. 
$ 63(c), can add another threshold in some cases. As a separate matter, an- 
other threshold is not added the itemized deduction phaseout, id. $ 68, which 
explicitly does not apply to $ 165(c) (2)-(3). Id. $ 68(c) (3). 
28. Id. $ 165(c)(3). 
29. Latin for "of the same kind or class." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th 
ed. 2004) ("A canon of construction that when a general word or phrase fol- 
lows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to in- 
clude only items of the same type as those listed."). 
30. Shearer v. Anderson, 17 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1927). 
31. Matheson v. Comm'r, 54 F.2d 537,539 (2d Cir. 1931). 
32. I.R.C. $ 106(a) (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided in this section, gross 
income of an employee does not include employer-provided coverage under 
an accident or health plan."); see also id. 5 105 (excluding from gross income 
amount received under health plans). 
33. Id. $ 213(a) (2000). Under the Alternative Minimum Tax, the threshold is 
actually the same for both medical expenses and $ 165 losses. Id. $ 56(b)(i)(B) 
USING INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY TO INTERPRET THE TAX CODE 
ance might explain why many affluent taxpayers choose not to  buy health 
insurance.34 Even with its hefty co-pay and 7.5% threshold, this partial na- 
tional health insurance program will cost the federal government approxi- 
mately $55 billion between 2006 and 2010.~~ 
11. EXAMPLES OF HOW INSURANCE LAW COULD HELP INTERPRET 
SECTIONS 165 AND 213 
Many court decisions and internal IRS documents endeavor to  properly 
apply $5 165 and 213 in the numerous different situations where taxpayers 
use them to claim deductions. This Part considers a number of actual and 
hypothetical tax issues arising under these sections. It demonstrates how 
application of insurance law principles leads to  equitable and efficient re- 
sults more effectively than tax law could reach alone. 
A. Public Policy Reasoning 
Courts have long recognized a "public policy" exception to the deducti- 
bility of a loss under 4 1 6 5 . ~ ~  While Congress has acted affirmatively to  curb 
judicial public policy discretion in other areas of tax law,37 it seems quite 
(AMT requires reaching 10% of Adjusted Gross Income for medical losses). 
As with 5 165, the opportunity to simply take the standard deduction, id. 5 
63(c), can impose an additional threshold on some taxpayers. As a separate 
matter, 5 68, which phases out most itemized deductions for individuals, ex- 
plicitly does not apply to § 213. Id. § 68 (c) (I). 
34. See Kaplow, Deductions, supra note 5; Kaplow, Insurance, supra note 5; see also 
Paul Fronstin, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Issue Brief, Sources of 
Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 
zoo6 Current Population Survey (Oct. 2oo6), available at http://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/briefspdf/EBRI-IB-ioa-zoo6i.pdf. Note that 5.4% of workers ages 16-64 
who earn over $ioo,ooo have no health insurance. Id. at fig.20. There are un- 
doubtedly other factors contributing to this surprising number, including 
free-lancers, risk-takers, and those with chronic medical conditions. 
35. OFFICE OF MGMT. 8r BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE BUDGET OF 
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 318 (2005) (tax expenditure item no). 
Note that the tax expenditures budget reflects only the very limited expendi- 
tures for 5 165(c)(3), not for all of 5 165, since most losses are presumably seen 
as part of the baseline of normal income against which tax expenditures are 
measured. Id. at 319 (tax expenditure item 134). 
36. See, e.g., Hopka v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Iowa 1961) (confis- 
cated slot machines). 
37. I.R.C. 5 162 (zooo), which covers "ordinary and necessary" business expenses 
used to be subject to a judicially-crafted public policy exception. See, e.g., 
Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). Congress codified and lim- 
ited judicial discretion over 5 162 in 1969. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91- 
172, 83 STAT. 549 (amending I.R.C. 5 162(c) and adding 55 162(f) and ($1. 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 26 : 309 2007 
content to let judges determine whether a 5 165 deduction would frustrate 
public policy. The IRS, not surprisingly, has proclaimed its intent to take 
advantage of this leeway to maximize revenues.38 Insurance case law also 
rests heavily on public policy reasoning, providing the IRS and federal 
courts with a great source of precedent and insight. 
The Tax Court could have explicitly borrowed from insurance case law 
to justify its holding in Blackman v. Comrni~sioner.~~ The taxpayer in that 
case returned from business in North Carolina and discovered that his wife 
had invited another man to move into their house in Baltimore. Outraged, 
he set his wife's clothes on fire on the kitchen stove, then doused the embers 
and headed out. Apparently having failed to douse the clothes properly, the 
fire spread to the rest of the house, destroying it.40 Although the Tax Court 
found the taxpayer only had a mens rea of "grossly negligent,"41 it nonethe- 
less denied the deduction, referring vaguely to "the articulated public policy 
of Maryland against arson and burning."42 The Tax Court nonetheless ad- 
mitted that it was well-settled that "mere negligence" of the taxpayer should 
not bar a casualty loss deduction.43 
Why does public policy require drawing the line at gross negligence, 
rather than at willful acts? Certainly nothing in the Tax Code suggests the 
result reached by the Tax Court, nor does Maryland's arson statute.44 Insur- 
ance cases have long recognized the rule, grounded in public policy, that 
gross negligence provides an insurance company a defense against paying a 
claim.45 The Tax Court could have simply reasoned that since the federal 
government acts as an insurer through 5 165, it should also have this de- 
fense. 
- - - - - - - 
38. Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977-1 C.B. 47 (disallowing deduction for seized slot ma- 
chines based on this legislative history). 
39. 88 T.C. 677 (1987). 
40. The taxpayer pled out to probation and got no jail time. Id. at 679. 
41. Id. at 682. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 681 (citing Anderson v. Comm'r, 81 F.2d 457, 460 (loth Cir. 1936), and 
Shearer v. Anderson, 16 F.2d 995,997 (ad Cir. 1927)). 
44. Maryland's arson statute says nothing of gross neghgence or a comparable 
mens rea. Rather it requires willfulness or malice. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW $9 6-101,6-103 (LexisNexis 2006). 
45. See, e.g., Chandler v. Worcester Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 57 Mass. 328 (1849); Hynds 
v. Schenectady County Mut. Ins. Co., 16 Barb. 119 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1852); see 
also Orient Ins. Co. v. Cox, 238 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Ark. 1951); Dynasty, Inc. v. 
Princeton Ins. Co., 754 A.2d 1137 (N.J. 2000). 
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The IRS and courts have denied deductions under 5 165 for all manner 
of forfeitures and other losses based on public policy  consideration^.^^ De- 
nying a deduction is not troubling as long as the losses result from criminal 
activity. An extensive gray area remains, full of potential losses which did 
not arise from criminal behavior, but from circumstances that courts find 
repugnant. Here, the tax law can look for guidance from the case law 
around both types of insurance: first-party and third-party. 
First-party insurance covers policyholders against losses to their own 
property. Tax law could draw from cases determining whether a first-party 
insurance contract covering the relevant loss would be unenforceable as 
against public Third-party insurance, such as automobile liability 
insurance or commercial general liability (CGL) insurance, covers payments 
that the policyholder must make to injured third parties. An extensive case 
law has developed to determine whether third-party insurance payments 
resulting from various actions would defeat public policy. For example, 
courts have long grappled with whether third-party insurance can and 
should cover behavior that merits punitive damages.48 Tax law could benefit 
from the public policy-based reasoning expressed in these cases. 
B. IS0 Forms 
Virtually all property and liability insurers offer the same contract lan- 
guage, which the Insurance Services Office (IS0)49 creates and sells to insur- 
46. See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1989) ("sharply defined 
national policy against the possession and sale of marijuana"); Wood v. 
United States, No. 0~-2i320-CIV-Huck/Turnoff, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25361 
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2002) ("smuggling freon and evading the excise taxes on it, 
not a perfectly legal business"); Mazzei v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 497 (1974) (tax- 
payer swindled out of counterfeited currency); Richey v. Comm'r, 33 T.C. 272 
(1959) (same). 
47. E.g., Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co., 948 P.2d 1264,1271 (Wash. 1997) (refusing to 
enforce contract for lack of insurable interest). 
48. Compare First Bank-Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 1217 (Mont. 
1984), with Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Powell, ig F. Supp. 2d 678 (N.D. Tex. 
1998). The issue of punitive damages and public policy should not be con- 
fused with the deductibility of punitive damages as business expenses under § 
162. On that matter, see Rev. Rul. 80-2ii,ig80-2 C.B. 57. 
49. IS0 is a private company that serves virtually the entire property and casualty 
insurance industry, providing data, risk-management, legal, regulatory, and 
underwriting services. See Insurance Services Office, http://www.iso.com (last 
visited Dec. 12,2007). 
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e r ~ . ~ '  Commentators have noted that insurance contracts are not only con- 
tracts of adhesion, but also contracts of "super-adhe~ion."~~ Not only do 
insurers offer contracts to consumers on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, but 
every insurance company also offers the same contract language, with small 
tweaks at most. 
This coordination has many social benefits, especially reducing transac- 
tion costs, facilitating easy price comparisons, enabling standardized data 
collection, and leading to predictable case law.52 These benefits explain why 
Congress exempted the insurance industry from most of the antitrust laws.53 
Indeed, even large corporations, which have the bargaining power and so- 
phistication to demand custom language, rarely deviate from the standard 
IS0 forms.54 
The process of IS0 form creation more closely resembles legislation 
than any traditional notion of contract formation.55 The IS0 has commit- 
tees and subcommittees, and the form contracts go through multiple draft 
revisions with extensive input and commentary from consumer groups, 
industry players, and state regulators.56 Ultimately, the standardized forms 
must be approved by fifty state insurance regulatory bodies. After issuance, 
they inevitably receive extensive scrutiny by legions of lawyers and judges. 
Because of this process, IS0 forms embody many practical insights into 
sound public policy and practice that could help in interpreting 5 165. Con- 
sider the case of Samuel Greenbaum, who moved out of his house one 
summer, without yet having found a buyer.57 The house remained unoccu- 
pied in December, when a water pipe in the cellar froze and burst, thereby 
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, AW OF INSURANCE ONTRACTS 5 4.06 (3d ed. 2006); 
see also Insurance Services Office, ISO's Policy Language and Rules, 
http://www.iso.com/products/oooo/prodoio.html (last visited Dec. 12,2007). 
STEMPEL, supra note 50,s  4.06[B] (emphasis added). 
See id. § 4.06[C] (listing the many benefits to both consumers and insurers of 
these industry-standard contracts). 
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. $5 1011-1015 (2000). The extent of 
the antitrust exception has been heavily litigated. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 
U.S. iig (1982); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978). Of 
course, the lobbying might of the insurance industry also helps explain this 
treatment. 
STEMPEL, supra note 50,s 4.06[B]. 
Id. 5 4.og[A]. This description applies to the property and liability insurance 
contracts, and less so to the health and life insurance contracts. 
Id. 
Greenbaum v. Comm'r, 8 B.T.A. 75 (1927). 
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flooding the basement. The court denied his casualty deduction under the 
predecessor to § 165 on the questionable grounds that it was a personal ex- 
pense." 
The IS0 Homeowners Broad Form handles just this sort of situation, 
denying coverage for "Accidental Discharge or Overflow of Water or 
Steam"59 "if the dwelling has been vacant for more than 60 consecutive days 
immediately before the loss"60 or if "caused by or resulting from freezing.'"jl 
ISO's data on hundreds of millions of homeowners' policies and years of 
experience made it recognize that serious water damage often occurs when 
the homeowner neglects commonsense precautions, allowing the house to 
freeze or leaving it vacant for a very long time. In the future, courts and the 
IRS could look to this collective wisdom to provide a more sound basis for 
the denial of a deduction like Mr. Greenbaum's or one of the myriad other 
situations addressed by the IS0 forms.62 
C. Preventive Costs 
If an insurer will pay for a particular expense or casualty, then it intui- 
tively makes sense for the insurer also to pay for preventing an impending 
expense or casualty when doing so would cost less. This approach also ap- 
peals to a sense of fairness and symmetry: if gross negligence can bar recov- 
ery from insurance, then prudent preventative expenses should be cov- 
ered.'j3 The IRS and Tax Court, however, have consistently denied deduc- 
tions for such items under 5 165.~~ 
58. Id. at 75-76. Greenbaum was based on the discredited theory that a casualty 
loss is personal (and not deductible) unless it is a total loss. See M.L. Cross, 
Annotation, What Constitutes "Casualty" Within Provisions of Internal Reve- 
nue Code Concerning Deduction of Losses Arising fiom Fires, Storms, Ship- 
wrecks, or Other Casualty, 41 A.L.R.2d 691,713 (1955). 
59. INS. SERV. OFFICE, HOMEOWNERS 2 BROAD FORM HO 00 02 05 06, "Section I: 
Perils Insured Against" 5 12 (2006) [hereinafter "IS0 FORM"]. 
60. Id. 5 12(b)(1) ("On the 'residence premises', if the dwelling has been vacant 
for more than 60 consecutive days immediately before the loss. A dwelling be- 
ing constructed is not considered vacant."). 
61. Id. 5 12(b) (3) (emphasis added). 
62. Compare id. 5 12(b) ("does not include loss. . . [t]o the system or appliance 
from which the water or steam escaped . . . ."), with Internal Revenue Serv., 
General Counsel Memorandum 34,229 (Nov. 28, 1969) (denying deduction 
for broken water heater). 
63. The taxpayer unsuccessfully made this argument in Austin v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 
1334,1337 (1980). 
64. The issue is generally mooted in 5 213 because it defines "medical care" to 
include "amounts paid. . . for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
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In Austin Y.  omm missioner,^^ the taxpayer's trees were inexorably over- 
taking power lines. After considering several alternatives and half-measures, 
all the trees were cut down. The Austin court denied the taxpayer's deduc- 
tion for the trees' value on the grounds that "other casualty" did not cover 
such slow-moving casualties. It glossed over the fact that the removal likely 
prevented a fire,66 which the plain language of 5 165(c) (3) covers. 
This denial could have found much stronger footing in cases consider- 
ing insurance claims in similar situations. For example, Rosen Y. State Farm 
General Insurance C O . ~ ~  dealt with a homeowner Rosen, whose contractor 
informed him that his decks were in imminent danger of ~ollapse.~' Rosen 
fixed the decks and sought reimbursement from his insurer, who denied 
coverage since the plain language of the policy defined collapse as "actually 
fallen down or fallen to pieces."69 
The trial court and appellate court found for Rosen, reasoning that pub- 
lic policy overrode the clear language of the contract, lest it "encourage 
property owners to place lives in danger in order to allow insurance carriers 
to delay payment of claims until the structure actually  collapse^."^^ The 
California Supreme Court reversed, noting that "[alpplying the same logic, 
with the same lack of restraint, courts could convert life insurance into 
health insurance."71 The court recognized that expanding coverage to pre- 
vention would create serious line-drawing problems.72 This same reasoning 
prevention of disease." I.R.C. 5 213(d)(i)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). The 
line-drawing issues around preventative medical expenses typically involve 
5 262, which disallows deductions for personal expenses. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 
2002-19, 2002-1 C.B. 778 (allowing deduction for weight-loss counseling, but 
not for diet food). Many commercial property insurance policies include a 
"sue and labor" clause that does cover imminent loss that would be covered if 
the loss were permitted to occur. Cf. GTE Corp. v. Mendale Mut. Ins. Co., 
372 F.gd 598 (3d Cir. 2004). This comports with the facts business or trade 
taxpayers could likely deduct fixing in advance, as an "ordinary and neces- 
sary" expense under 5 162. 
74 T.C. 1334 (1980). 
See CAL. DEP'T OF FORESTRY AND FIRE PROTECTION, TREES + POWER LINES = 
DISASTER   ZOO^), available at http://www.fire.ca.gov/about~content/down- 
loads/powerlines.pdf. 
70 P.gd 351 (Cal. 2003). 
Id. at 353. 
Id. 
Id. (quotations omitted). 
Id. at 355. 
Id. 
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would justify the Tax Court's denial in Austin, as the contrary result would 
have created difficult line-drawing problems and turned 5 165(c)(3) into a 
deduction for grounds-keeping expenses.73 
D. The Principle of Indemnity 
One of insurance law's most fundamental principles is the principle of 
indemnity, that "net gain to an insured through the receipt of insurance 
proceeds exceeding a loss should be regarded as inimical to the public inter- 
e ~ t . " ~ ~  If an insured could receive a net gain as the result of an insured event, 
that would create perverse incentives. For example, if a homeowner could 
recover $3oo,ooo from insurance to rebuild a fire-ravaged house that only 
costs $200,000 to rebuild, then the homeowner would have a $ioo,ooo in- 
centive either to start a fire or to forego precautions. 
A closely related corollary is the doctrine of insurable interest, which al- 
lows parties to insure only property in which they have an interest, thereby 
removing incentives for socially destructive activities such as arson.75 The 
doctrine of insurable interest would lead to the same result as current tax 
case law in many circumstances. For example, courts have long denied 5 165 
deductions to purchasers who have not yet received title, even though the 
purchaser paid for insurance and storage.76 The Tax Court has also denied 
deductions to holders of purchase options77 and to those having mere pos- 
session.78 
Similarly, 5 213 and the associated  regulation^^^ effectively adhere to the 
principle of indemnity by limiting the deduction to amounts actually paid 
for medical care, which is given a carefully circumscribed definition. For 
example, medical care does not include transportation costs whenever they 
73. Interestingly, "usual and ordinary" repairs to a dwelling were deductible 
under the 1867 code. Revenue Act of 1867, ch. 169, 5 13, 14 Stat. 478. The 
draftsmen of the 1867 Act apparently recognized the serious line drawing 
problems that might emerge: "no deduction shall be made for any amount 
paid out for new buildings, permanent improvements or betterments, made 
to increase the value of any property or estate." Id. 
74. Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co., 948 P.2d 1264,1271 (Wash. 1997) (quoting ROBERT 
E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES, PRACTITIO- 
NER'S EDITION 5 3.i(a) at 135 (1988)). 
75. See id. at 1271-72. 
76. Haas Bros. v. McLaughlin, 39 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1930). 
77. Dankos v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 722 (1986). 
78. Corcoran v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 972 (1976). 
79. Treas. Reg. 5 1.213-1 (2006). 
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contain a significant element of personal pleasure or lodging costs over $50 
per nightsgo The IRS regulations allow a deduction for adding a medically 
necessary elevator or exercise pool to one's house, but only to the extent 
that it does not increase the value of the property.81 
These sections, however, take the principle of indemnity beyond where 
insurance law does, perhaps reflecting the unique rigidity of tax law.82 In 
doing so, tax law often results in unjust or economically inefficient results. 
To see the potential injustice, consider two taxpayers A and B with identical 
incomes and with houses worth $loo,ooo in Mississippi. A bought her house 
thirty years ago and has an adjusted basis of $20,000, while B bought her 
house one year ago and has an adjusted basis of $loo,ooo. Both A and B 
thought they did not need flood insurance, and both saw their houses de- 
stroyed by unexpected-and ~ninsured~~-flood waters in Hurricane 
Katrina. Both face identical huge costs to return to their pre-Katrina way of 
life, yet A gets almost no  tax break reflecting these hardships: her deduction 
is capped by the $zo,ooo basis,84 minus 10% of her adjusted gross income. 
A's 5 165 deduction might not even exceed the standard deduction that she 
could get if she didn't itemize her  deduction^.^' 
Some of the IRS regulations implementing 5 165 also can result in eco- 
nomic inefficiency. Consider a hypothetical lumberyard in Louisiana seri- 
80. I.R.C. 5 213(d)(2)(B) (2000). 
81. Treas. Reg. 5 1.213-l(e)(i)(iii) (2006). Of course, the extent to which it does 
increase the value of the property would be added to the adjusted basis. Even 
if this adjustment in basis provided any benefit to the taxpayer, it would be 
only upon selling the property. Several provisions make it unlikely that it will 
ever produce any benefit. I.R.C. § 1014 (2000) (basis reset to fair market value 
when passed on at death); id. 5 121(b) (I) (sheltering most capital gains from a 
house anyhow). 
82. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522,542-43 (1979) (emphasizing 
the difference between the purposes of the tax laws and financial accounting). 
83. This hypothetical is hardly speculative for many homeowners. See Leonard v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (finding for 
insurer on Katrina damage caused mostly by flood, against which the home- 
owner had not insured on advice of Nationwide's agent). 
84. 1.R:C. 5 165(b) (2000); Treas. Reg. 5 1.165-1 (2006). 
85. The standard deduction is available to taxpayers who choose not to itemize 
deductions, such as the mortgage interest deduction and the deductions pro- 
vided by $5 165 and 213. In 2006, the standard deduction was $5150 for single 
filers and $io,300 for married filing jointly. See I.R.S. Form 1040 (2006), avail- 
able at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdfIfio4o.pdf. 
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ously damaged by uninsured flooding in Katrina.86 Given that reconstruc- 
tion will result in a much greater demand for its services, it would make 
sense to  allow it to repair in such a way as to increase its capacity. Doing so 
would deny it a current deduction under the existing regulations, as it 
would fail the test as to whether "the repairs are necessary to  restore the 
property to its condition immediately before the casualty."87 
Insurance money generally comes without these sorts of restrictions and 
hence does not create similar economic inefficiencies. It  does so without 
violating the principle of indemnity. Some of the severity of the regulations 
around $5 165 and 213 might stem from the fact that when adopted, the top 
marginal tax rate was 91%." AS a result, the danger of violating the indem- 
nity principle with overly generous deductions was quite high, as allowing a 
deduction inflated by as little as one-tenth could lead to taxpayers receiving 
benefits greater than their losses.89 As rates have significantly decreased, so 
has the risk of violating the principle of indemnity with $5 165 and 213. This 
86. The same economic inefficiency could also apply to personal expenditures. 
Consider a growing family thinking of adding two new bedrooms above its 
garage. Katrina then severely damages the garage. This seems like a perfect 
opportunity to address the needs of the growing family, but doing so would 
cost the family its casualty loss deduction. 
87. Treas. Reg. $ 1.165-7(a)(z)(ii) (2006). Nor would the lumberyard likely get any 
relief from the alternate method of valuing loss, appraised fair market value, 
governed by id. 5 1.165-7(a)(z)(i). Katrina almost certainly led to a severe 
"general market decline." See id. As a result, rather than a current deduction, 
the lumberyard would likely have to capitalize the improvements. 
88. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, section i(a), 68A Stat. 5 (Aug. 
16, 1954). The 91% bracket applied to any income over $200,000. The IRS 
adopted both Treasury Regulations $5 1.165-7 and 1.213-1 in 1960. 
89. For example, say that a taxpayer in the 91% bracket suffered a loss of $1000, 
but was able to deduct one-tenth more (i.e., $1100) due to lax tax regulations. 
That would save the taxpayer 91% times $1100 = $1001, thereby allowing the 
taxpayer a net profit of $1. Of course, if the taxpayer could deduct even more 
than $1100, the net profits to the taxpayer increase proportionally. 
The potential injustices and economic inefficiencies from restrictions on 
the medical expense deduction are less clear, but still present. For example, 
$ 213(d)(2)(B) denies deductibility for travel expenses that have any "signifi- 
cant element of personal pleasure, recreation, or vacation." Consider a child 
with terminal cancer. The parents are deciding between two specialists, one in 
Florida and one in Minnesota, equally good in all respects except for location. 
If they choose the one in Florida so that their child can visit Ibisneyworld 
once, they will be denied the deduction for travel expenses. The utility gained 
from vacation-like experiences near the end of a life can be particularly high, 
yet the tax code discourages such utility-maximizing behavior. 
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considerable drop in rates argues for a reassessment of the economic ineffi- 
ciencies and inequities such restrictions create. 
E. One Casualty or Two? 
Due to wet weather, in 1993 the Mississippi River basin suffered exten- 
sive flooding, with two main episodes, one from April to May, and again 
from June through O c t ~ b e r . ~ ~  The total damage fell between $10 billion and 
, $15 billion in 1993 dollars.91 Due to a combination of cost concerns and a 
false sense of security, a substantial number of the affected homeowners had 
no flood insurance.92 
As a result, significant sums of money depended upon whether the two 
episodes of Mississippi flooding were one casualty or two for the purposes 
of 5 165. Subsection 165(i) allows the taxpayer to elect to carry the loss from 
a federally recognized disaster back to the previous year. If the two episodes 
of flooding were indeed two casualties, then taxpayers would benefit im- 
mensely by carrying back part of their losses to the previous year, and keep- 
ing the remainder of the deduction for the current year. Doing this would 
erase their highest marginal rate income for two years, rather than for one.93 
The IRS found no precedent on point and ultimately ruled in favor of 
two casualties on the questionable basis of vague congressional intent to 
bring tax relief to devastated areas via 5 165(i).~~ The IRS simply ignored the 
fact that Congress passed 5 165(i) in 1962 in response to a single devastating 
hurricane, giving no indication whatsoever of when a series of events would 
count as multiple disasters. If the IRS had ruled in favor of one casualty, 
90. Internal Revenue Serv., Technical Assistance in Determining if Losses 
Resulting from Multiple Floods Constitute a Single Casualty, I.R.S. Field Serv. 
Adv. Mem. (Apr. 1,1994). 
91. Id. 
92. Albert R. Karr, False Sense of Security and Cost Concerns Keep Many on Flood 
Plains from Buyinglnsurance, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 31,1993, at A12. 
93. Due to the progressive tax system and inability of individual taxpayers to 
carry over non-business casualty losses, I.R.C. 5 ip(d)(4) (zooo), this would 
be a huge tax boon. The same issue-how many casualties occurred-was 
also relevant to whether the $100 threshold on the deduction for individual 
taxpayers had to be met once or twice. Id. 5 165(h)(i) ("Any loss of an indi- 
vidual described in subsection (c)(g) shall be allowed only to the extent that 
the amount of the loss to such individual arising from each casualty, or from 
each theft, exceeds $ loo."). Although much less important here, this limita- 
tion to "each casualty" might become much more important in some circum- 
stances, such as where many casualties occurred. 
94. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 90, at "13-14. Since this ruling was over- 
whelmingly favorable to taxpayers, it is not surprising that no litigation chal- 
lenged this IRS determination. 
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5 165(i) would have still granted substantial tax relief to taxpayers. Nothing 
in the legislative history mandated that the IRS maximize this relief. 
Insurance law, however, has many cases addressing whether a particular 
loss constitutes one or more "occurrences," upon which the IRS could have 
drawn instead. For example, the IRS could have adopted the approach of 
the Connecticut Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Aetna 
Casualty e5 Surety C O . , ~ ~  which interpreted "occurrence" to cover only losses 
occurring in the same time and at the same place.96 Since there were two 
temporally separate periods of flooding that affected each property, the IRS 
could have found two separate occurrences, regardless of common causa- 
tion by underlying weather patterns. 
I F. "Other Insurance" Clauses 
I Many insurance policies come with so-called "other insurance" clauses 
I 
I that specify how the policy interacts with other insurance covering the same 
I loss. There are three types of "other insurance" clauses: pro-rata, sharing 
I 
coverage equally with other applicable insurance; escape, seeking to avoid 
any coverage; and excess, providing insurance only after the exhaustion of all 
I 
I other applicable coverage.97 
1 Many interesting issues come up when two insurance policies covering a 
I 
I loss have conflicting "other insurance" clauses. For example, if a policy- 
I holder has two policies each with an excess clause, then neither policy kicks 
i in until the other one is exhausted. But, neither policy will be exhausted if 
i neither ever kicks in. This presents a "chicken and eggn9' problem for courts, which have developed rules to resolve such  situation^.'^ 
95. 765 A.2d 891 (Conn. 2001). 
96. Id. at goo. Of course, there is conflicting insurance case law, so if the IRS had 
reached the opposite conclusion and had wanted to defend against the on- 
slaught of taxpayer suits, they could have looked to the underlying cause. See, 
e.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (gd Cir. 
1982). Note that while the World Trade Center insurance case centered on the 
meaning of "occurrence," the Second Circuit simply punted that hot multi- 
billion-dollar issue to a jury, based on the intentions of the parties. See World 
Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.gd 154, 190 (2d Cir. 
2003). On the inutility of insurance cases decided on such contract law prin- 
ciples for the purpose of tax law, see Section 1II.C. 
97. Carriers Ins. Co. v. Am. Policyholders' Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 216,218 (Me. 1979). 
98. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So. 2d 750, 753-54 
(La. Ct. App. 1966) (Tate, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe primary and (attempted) 
secondary liability of each policy chase the other through infinity, something 
like trying to answer the question: Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" 
(emphasis added)). 
99. Carriers, 404 A.2d at 219. 
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Sections 165 and 213 both contain "other insurance clauses," with the 
exact same statutory text: "not compensated for by insurance or other- 
wise."lO' These are "excess" clauses, providing the free partial insurance only 
in excess of any other applicable coverage or source of recovery. The same 
issues that come up with private "other insurance" clauses also can arise 
with respect to these clauses. Of course, in the unlikely situation where a 
private insurer dared write a clause that would conflict with the other insur- 
ance clause in $5 165 or 213, a court would obviously find for the IRS.'O1 
However, consider the possibility that the other form of excess compen- 
sation comes from another government to which the United States owes 
comity, be it one of the states or a foreign government. For example, say a 
foreign multinational suffered a loss to property in the United States due to 
an uninsured catastrophe, and the multinational's home country offered a 
casualty deduction provision similar to 5 165.'02 The IRS might attempt to 
deny the deduction to the extent that the other country's deduction com- 
pensated it; meanwhile, the other country could make the reverse claim. 
When facing such a conflict, the IRS and Tax Court could apply the clear 
majority rule for handling similar conflicts between private insurers: disre- 
gard the other insurance clauses and simply prorate the deductions.lo3 
G. Inherent Defects 
Rock-A-Bye Lady won numerous championships and ribbons in ama- 
teur horse shows from 1967 to 1972.1°4 She became tragically ill from the 
intestinal disease colic one day in 1972 and died the next day, aged just eight 
years,lo5 compared to a horse's typical life expectancy of twenty to twenty- 
five years."" Her owners attempted to take a deduction under § 165 for her 
101. Many bases exist for such a decision, including: congressional intent, public 
policy, see supra Section II.A, federal law's supremacy over state insurance 
law, and the broad grant of the Sixteenth Amendment. 
102. Or, even more compellingly, the company's home country could offer a tax 
credit covering the losses. 
. 103. See Carriers, 404 A.2d at 220. The method of proration, see id. at 221-22, is 
I generally not relevant, since $ 165 has no limit on coverage. The only possible 
issue would be whether the pro-ration should be done giving half the deduc- 
tion in one country, half in another. Alternatively, it could be done based on 
, the multinational's marginal tax rates in the two countries, so that each coun- 
1 try bears half the loss in tax revenues. 
1 104. Daugette v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 252,253 (1977). 
105. Id. 
106. See Horses and Horsemanship, in 20 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 
MACROPAEDIA 646,648 (15th ed. 2002). 
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considerable value. The Tax Court denied the deduction based on extensive 
precedent requiring that a casualty result from a "sudden or destructive 
force,"lo7 by applying the canon of ejusdem generis'08 to the statutory list 
"fire, storm, shipwreck, or other cas~alty." '~~ 
The Tax Court could have much better justified its decision on basic in- 
surance principles. Insurance companies and courts do not permit insur- 
ance coverage for guaranteed events, as no socially beneficial risk transfer 
occurs, and society actually loses the administrative costs involved in issuing 
the policy and handling the ~lairn."~ So, a loss that is intrinsically guaran- 
teed to happen should be uninsurable, and a horse is intrinsically guaran- 
teed to die."' 
In an illustrative early insurance case on point, a policyholder sued for 
reimbursement for a rare specimen of opal that had developed a crack en- 
tirely on its own.'12 This type of opal has an inherent tendency to develop 
fissures over time, without the application of external force.l13 The court 
107. Daugette, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 254 (citing Appleman v. United States, 338 F.2d 
729 (7th Cir. 1964)). 
108. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
109. I.R.C. 5 165(c)(3) (2000). 
110. The Tax Court had an intuitive understanding of intrinsic loss, noting that 
"[tlhe veterinarian who attended Rock-A-Bye Lady during her colic attack 
stated that the horse's death was due to her own inherent physical weakness." 
Daugette, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 254. See generally STEMPEL, supra note 50, 
5 1.03 [A] (explaining risk and what risks are insurable). 
11 1. Human term life insurance insures only against death before a certain point, 
not against death itself. See id. Of course, an insurance company could issue a 
similar life insurance policy on the life of a horse, and Rock-A-Bye Lady was 
indeed insured, although only for $io,ooo despite being the "best living Ten- 
nessee Walking Horse mare." Daugette, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 254. The key dis- 
tinction is that 5 165 is a type of casualty insurance, not a type of life insur- 
ance. The Tax Court has made clear that 5 165's "other casualty" does not in- 
clude the losses from the death of a human. See Procter v. Comm'r, lg T.C. 
387,395 (1952). 
112. Chute v. North River Ins. Co., 214 N.W. 473 (Minn. 1927); see also British & 
Foreign Marine Ins. Co. v. Gaunt, [ig21] 2 A.C. 41,57 (H.L.) ("For wool to get 
wet in the rain is a casualty, though not a grave one; it is not a thing intended 
but is accidental; it is something which injures the wool from without; it does 
not develop from within."). See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Peril and For- 
tuity in Property and Liability Insurance, 36 TORT 8r INS. L. J. 777 (2001) (dis- 
cussing the intrinsic-loss issue and fortuity). 
113. Chute, 214 N.W. at 473. 
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held that the public policy against covering guaranteed events overrode 
plain contract language favorable to the insured.l14 
H. Cosmetic Surgery 
Prior to iggo, the Tax Court and IRS allowed taxpayers to take 5 213 de- 
ductions for cosmetic surgery, ranging from hair transplants for baldness,'15 
to electrolysis,116 to  full facelifts.'17 In iggo, Congress overruled these deci- 
sions, adding 5 zi3(d) (g), which explicitly disallows deductions for cosmetic 
surgery unless necessitated by "congenital abnormality, a personal injury 
resulting from an  accident o r  trauma, or  disfiguring disease."l18 The IRS and 
Tax Court could have reached the same result and avoided Congress' rebuke 
by simply recognizing that 5 213 acts as insurance. 
It makes n o  sense to insure against non-probabilistic events.llg This ob- 
servation explains why insurance does not cover intentional acts by the in- 
sured120 o r  inevitable decay.121 Insurance against a non-probabilistic ex- 
pense, such as elective cosmetic surgery, would simply cost its present value, 
plus administrative fees and a profit for the insurer. The exceptions to  
5 213's cosmetic surgery exclusion cover precisely those situations where 
cosmetic surgery does result from probabilistic events: personal injury, dis- 
figuring disease, and birth defects. The IRS could have used insurance law 
114. Id. at 474. On contra proferentem, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (8th ed. 
2004) ("The doctrine that, in interpreting documents, ambiguities are to be 
construed unfavorably to the drafter."). 
115. Mattes v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 650 (1981). 
116. Rev. Rd. 82-111,1982-1 C.B. 48. 
117. Rev. Rd. 76-332,1976-2 C.B. 81. 
118. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 5 ii342(a), 
104 Stat. 1388 (codified at I.R.C. 5 zi3(d)(9) (2000)). For a recent application, 
see Int. Legal Mem. 200603025 (Oct. 14, 2005), reprinted in 2006 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 4-12 (sex changes not deductible). 
119. Health insurance often pays for basic preventative care and check-ups to 
reduce the probability of larger future losses, so that is itself a form of insur- 
ance. Cf. I.R.C. 5 zi3(d) (I) (A) (2000) (covering "prevention of disease"). One 
possible exception is the ill-designed government requirement from the 1980s 
that asbestos-removal contractors have long-term coverage for the health 
problems that were sure to emerge. At the time, it was clear that certain health 
problems would emerge. This could perhaps be thought of more as a type of 
mandated pre-payment. 
120. See discussion supra Section 1I.A; supra note 45. 
121. See discussion supra Section 1I.G; see also Abraham, supra note 112. Cosmetic 
surgery such as facelifts or hair transplants simply fix inherent defects in hu- 
man beings, who inevitably age and suffer from wrinkled skin and less hair. 
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reasoning to issue regulations identical to the change that Congress ulti- 
mately made. 
Moreover, Congress itself could have much better justified adding 
5 213(d) (9)  on insurance grounds. Instead, the legislative history explained 
this change on the tax law principle that personal expenditures should not 
be ded~ctible: '~~ "Expenses for purely cosmetic procedures that are not 
medically necessary are, in essence, voluntary personal expenses, which like 
other personal expenditures (e.g., food and clothing) generally should not 
be ded~ctible."'~~ This rationale does nothing to explain why it carved out 
an exception for surgery to correct "congenital abnormalities," which is a 
clearly "voluntary personal expense." Congress had the correct intuition but 
failed to articulate proper reasoning. 
I. Efficient Proximate Causation 
A combination of two (or more) causes often leads to a policyholder's 
loss, with one cause covered by the policy, and the other not covered. For 
example, in one case, a homeowner lived on a mountain, and a power com- 
pany negligently clear-cut the forest uphill, causing a mudslide that de- 
stroyed the house.124 While the policy did cover destruction due to the neg- 
ligence of others, it did not cover mudslides. To untangle such problems, 
courts have developed and widely adopted'25 the ''efficient proximate cause" 
rule, which looks to whether the predominant cause was ~ 0 v e r e d . l ~ ~  
The same combination of causes also comes up in 5 165 casualty cases. 
In one case, a taxpayer's house suffered severe damage at the hands of its 
plumbers.'27 First, the plumbing company negligently installed an under- 
ground pipe without any protection.12* Then, when inspecting the plumbing 
later, an employee accidentally stepped on the unprotected pipe, causing a 
release of water that severely damaged the house's foundations. 
122. I.R.C. 5 262 (2000). 
123. 136 CONG. REC. 30,570 (1990) (emphasis added). 
124. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bongen, 925 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1996). See 
generally Mark D. Wuerfel & Mark Koop, Eficient Proximate Causation in the 
Context of Property Insurance Claims, 65 DEE. COUNS. J. 400 (1998). 
125. 5 J. APPLEMAN, I SURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 5 3083, at 309-11 (1970). 
126. See Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704,706-09 (Cal. 1989). 
127. Hayutin v. Comm'r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 50g,537-3g,560-6i(ig72). 
128. The negligent construction was found by a state trial court. Id. at 537-39. 
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Tax case law does not allow deductions for faulty constr~ct ionl~~ but 
does for sudden accidents. The Tax Court employed the efficient proximate 
cause rule without even recognizing it as such, finding the accidental step- 
ping on the pipe to be the "primary cause" and hence allowing the deduc- 
tion.130 Simply employing the efficient proximate cause rule would have 
avoided duplicating the underlying reasoning and would have ushered in a 
large body of insurance precedent to handle future cases. 
Using the efficient proximate cause rule would also help decide border- 
line 5 213 medical expense controversies. Consider the venerable case of 
Ochs v. Cornrni~sioner,~~~ involving a taxpayer whose wife was convalescing 
from throat cancer. Her doctor strictly instructed the couple to send their 
children away to boarding school until she had recovered, lest the stresses of 
maternal responsibility lead to a fatal recurrence. The Second Circuit disal- 
lowed deduction of boarding school expenses, fretting that if courts allowed 
this expense, then some taxpayers would attempt to deduct expenses for 
nannies or a The scathing dissent decried.the "scant" statutory or 
legislative history in favor of denying the deduction133 and noted that courts 
regularly draw lines.134 
The rule of efficient proximate causation would provide an excellent 
line-drawing tool in an area of tax law where lines remain hard to draw.13' 
The IRS and Tax Court could allow for a deduction whenever a covered 
disease is the efficient proximate cause of the expense.136 In the case of Ochs, 
129. See Rountree v. Comm'r, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 810 (1968); cf. F & H 
Constr. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 12 Cal. Rptr. jd 896 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004) (insurance should not act as a construction bond). 
130. Hayutin, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) at 561. This is the variation of the efficient proxi- 
mate cause rule favored by the dissent in State Farm Fire e+ Cas. Co. v. Bongen, 
925 P.2d 1042,1048 (Alaska 1996). 
131. 195 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1952) (Augustus Noble Hand, J.). The majority opinion's 
author was the cousin of Judge Learned Hand. 
132. Id. at 694. 
133. Id. at 695 (Frank, J., dissenting) ("[Mly colleagues[] are certain Congress did 
not intend relief for a man in this grave plight. The truth is, of course, no one 
knows what Congress would have said if it had been faced with these facts."). 
134. Id. at 698. 
135. The IRS seems to have softened its stance on such matters since Ochs. See, e.g., 
Rev. Rul. 75-318, 1975-2 C.B. 88 (braille books deductible); Rev. Rul. 64-173, 
1964-1 C.B. (pt. 1) 121 (hiring guide for blind child deductible). 
136. Indeed, the dissent's reasoning at times suggested an intuition that efficient 
proximate cause would make a good line-drawing tool. "Congress required 
only that medical expenses be 'primarily' for the patient's recovery. The evi- 
dence here, moreover, establishes (and the Tax Court so found) that the effect 
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the disease predated the boarding school expenses, and the taxpayers sent 
their children away only while the wife was under strict doctor's orders. A 
court would easily find her illness the efficient proximate cause. By com- 
parison, hiring a cook would have had an efficient proximate cause of the 
human need to eat, which predated the illness and which drives behavior in 
the absence of disease. Hiring a cook would hence fall on the other side of 
the line. 
J. Reconsidering "Reasonable Expectations of the Taxpayer" 
In 1971, Professor Robert Keeton distilled a principle from insurance 
case law that he called honoring the reasonable expectations of the in- 
s ~ r e d . ' ~ ~  The complexity of insurance contracts means few consumers actu- 
ally read their policies, so courts will often extend coverage to cases not cov- 
ered by the contract when it comports with reasonable expectations of cov- 
erage.13' Some jurisdictions have explicitly adopted this principle; some 
appear to have implicitly endorsed it, while others disregard it.13' 
Interestingly, just three years earlier in 1968, a Note in the Chicago Law 
Review had argued for honoring the reasonable expectations of taxpayers in 
interpreting $ i65(c)(3).140 While this goes to exemplify the similarities be- 
tween $ 165's free insurance and private insurance, the reasonable expecta- 
tions of taxpayers has received significantly less traction with judges.141 
Given the viability and acceptance of reasonable expectations of the insured, 
perhaps this idea deserves renewed consideration. 
111. LIMITATIONS ON USING INSURANCE LAW TO INTERPRET SECTIONS 165 
AND 213 
While insurance case law and practice has a great deal to contribute to 
$ 165 and $ 213 jurisprudence, this approach has limits. This Part details 
on the wife's health was the sole consideration inducing her husband's action 
even if it was not the sole result." Ochs, 195 F.2d at 696 (emphasis added); see 
also id. ("direct or proximate therapeutic relation") (emphasis added). 
138. See, e.g., Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 365 A.2d 744 
(N.H. 1976). 
139. For a summary of the state of acceptance, see Roger C. Henderson, The 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations i n  Insurance Law After Two Decades, 
51 OHIO ST.  L.J. 823 (1990); and see generally Symposium on the Insurance Law 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 1 (1998). 
140. Note, The Casualty Loss Deduction and Consumer Expectation: Section 
165(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 220 (1968). 
141. The only reported decisions citing to it do so for its excellent discussion of the 
history of 5 165 (c) (3) and its predecessors. 
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three of these limitations and considers what they reveal about the differ- 
ence between private insurance and this free partial government insurance. 
A. Partial Interests in Property 
Gertrude Becker had a life estate in her house, yet she paid the same 
homeowners insurance premiums that would have applied were she owner 
of the house in fee ~ imp1e . l~~  Her house caught fire, and she died approxi- 
mately nineteen minutes into the ~0nflagration.l~~ The insurer denied the 
claim of her executor, arguing that since the life estate ended with her life, 
she had lost nothing.144 
The highest court of Maryland found against the insurer, holding that 
liability attached when the fire started.145 The insurer had received the same 
premiums from the deceased as if it had been covering a fee simple and 
could not escape full recompense. Although the remaindermen were not 
parties to that suit, in a similar case the Oregon Supreme Court awarded all 
the insurance proceeds to the life tenant who had paid the premiums, with 
none for the remainderman. 14' 
This just and sensible result cannot be extended into the realm of 5 165 
jurisprudence, for the simple fact that the insurance provided by § 165 is 
free. The IRS favors an apportionment of casualty losses between a life ten- 
ant and a remainderman.147 While the life tenant can almost certainly de- 
duct the cost of debris removal, other losses must be apportioned based on 
evidence, with the default coming from actuarial tables reflecting life expec- 
tancies. This approach comports with justice and efficiency in the absence of 
one party's payment of premiums. 
B. Highly Correlated Risks 
Just as it makes no sense to insure against eventualities that are cer- 
tain-such as intentional acts or inherent f l a ~ s l ~ ~ i t  also makes no sense to 
142. Home Ins. Co. v. Adler, 309 A.2d 751, 753 n.2 (Md. 1973). But see 
Beekman v. Fulton & Montgomery Counties Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 
73 N.Y.S. no (N.Y. App. Div. 1901). 
143. Home Ins. Co., 309 A.2d at 751. 
144. Except for personal property. Id. 
145. Id. at 754. 
146. Morris v. Morris, 544 P.2d 1034 (Or. 1976) (giving full proceeds to still-alive 
life tenant over remainderman's challenge). 
147. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,236 (Aug. 26, 1977). This memo indicates that in 
situations such as Bliss v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1958), where the 
remaindermen do not also attempt to deduct a portion of the loss, the life 
tenant may have the entire deduction. 
148. See discussion supra Sections 1I.A and 1I.G. 
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insure against highly correlated risks. At one extreme, automobile accidents 
tend to  be highly uncorrelated with each other, making them ideal subjects 
of insurance. At the other extreme, all-out nuclear war results in massive, 
completely-correlated property losses. 
Many other types of insurance fall between these two extremes.149 For 
example, while property losses due to noryeasters in New England are highly 
correlated with each other, they are uncorrelated with losses due to thun- 
derstorms in Oregon or  tornados in  Nebraska. Hence, homeowners policies 
offer protection against weather damage. By contrast, war results in suffi- 
ciently correlated losses that the vast majority of insurance contracts exclude 
coverage.150 Nuclear incidents also have the potential to create such highly 
correlated losses that policies exclude coverage, even if the discharge is en- 
tirely accidental. lS1 
In  contrast, taxpayers can deduct losses due to  war, terrorist acts, and 
nuclear accident under 5 165. '~~ Four differences in function justify this di- 
vergence. First, the United States government acts on  a much larger scale 
than any private insurer possibly could, giving it the ability to  absorb large, 
correlated losses. Second, the government is not subject to  many of the 
market imperfections that discourage private insurers from taking on  such 
catastrophic risks.153 Third, unlike private insurers, the federal goverhment 
- 
149. Other factors also can discourage private insurance of certain types of risks. 
See Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Mar- 
kets, and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205 (1997) (arguing that institu- 
tional factors such as tax, accounting, and takeover risk result in private in- 
surers not providing insurance against earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods, 
although financial markets have been innovating around these problems). 
150. IS0 FORM, supra note 59, at "Section I Exclusions" 5 6. Incidentally, insurers 
made a wise public-relations move after glii not to invoke the war exclusion, 
despite talk of a "War on Terror." See Christopher Oster, Insurers Pledge Act 
of War Won't Block Claims, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,2001, at A3. 
151. IS0 FORM, supra note 59, at "Section I Exclusions" 5 6 ("Discharge of a 
nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike act [and hence excluded] even if ac- 
cidental."). See generally STEMPEL, supra note 50,s l.og[B] [z] . 
152. Reiner v. United States, 222 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1955) (loss due to enemy 
bombardment); Popa v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 130 (1979) (loss of personal property 
due to fall of South Vietnam). Without prodding from any case law, the IRS 
openly proclaims that terrorist attacks are deductible. I.R.S. Pub. 547, at 2 
(2006). See generally Terrence Chorvat & Elizabeth Chorvat, Income Tax: as 
Implicit Insurance Against Losses from Terrorism, 36 IND. L. REV. 425, 438-43 
(2003). 
153. See Chorvat & Chorvat, supra note 152, at 438-43 (showing how unfavorable 
rules on tax carryovers and carrybacks discourage private insurers from taking 
on huge risks); Jaffee & Russell, supra note 149. 
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has non-pecuniary concerns such as macroeconomic stability and taxpayer 
solvency. Indeed, Congress has explicitly indicated that it views 5 165 as a 
form of disaster relief, and used it as such.154 
Finally, the federal government, with its war powers, vast intelligence 
community, and regulatory agencies, is the least-cost avoider of these catas- 
trophic 10sses.l~~ Democracy unfortunately seems to fail in providing incen- 
tives to federal officials to actually avoid them. For example, federal officials 
often see improvements in their popularity ratings after terrorist attacks and 
the inception of wars.156 Section 165 counters this moral hazard by forcing 
government decision makers to face a substantial fiscal impact from such 
government failures. 
C. Insurance Law Based on Inapplicable Contract Reasoning 
Insurance policies are contracts, albeit highly regulated and standard- 
ized contracts with a specialized body of case law and practice behind them. 
In many insurance cases, as with many garden-variety contracts cases, the 
result comes from public policy rea~0ning.l~~ Not all of the contract law 
principles that courts use to decide insurance cases translate properly into 
tax law. 
For example, an insurance case relying on the "intent of the parties"158 
has little to contribute to tax law, as Congress and individual taxpayers 
never have anything like a meeting of the minds. In the same vein, courts 
generally employ contra proferentem to construe insurance contracts against 
the drafter, as courts often do with contracts of adhe~ i0n . l~~  Taxpayers, 
however, never contracted with the federal government and never paid a 
154. 108 CONG. REC. 34 (1962) (enacting § 165(i)'s carryback provision as a form of 
immediate disaster assistance). 
155. Cf. Chorvat & Chorvat, supra note 152, at 443-45 (talking about terrorist 
attacks). 
156. See, e.g., Graphic, President Bush's Approval Ratings, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 
2005 (showing huge spikes in popularity after the September 11, 2001 attacks 
and again after the commencement of the Iraq war), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/~oo~/o~/~~/ 
GR2005042500945.html; see also HISTORICAL BUSH APPROVAL RATINGS (Oct. 
23,2007), http://www.hist.umn.edu/-rug-gles/Approval.htm. 
157. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS $9 178-199 (1981) 
(detailing the interaction between public policy and contract law). 
158. E.g., World Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154, 
184 (2d Cir. 2003). 
159. See generally STEMPEL, supra note 50, $5 4.08 [F], 4.ii[F] [n]. 
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premium160 for the insurance they receive under $4 165 and 213. Insurance 
cases decided via pure contract language interpretation161 also have little to 
add to tax law, as courts already have access to well-developed canons of 
statutory interpretation that serve similar g0a1s.l~~ 
Finally, insurance cases sometimes involve overruling an insurance con- 
tract term as being void for public policy. Since Congress proclaims public 
policy via the Tax Code, courts obviously cannot and should not overrule 
terms on this basis.163 Similarly, the deference courts show to IRS regula- 
tions makes it inappropriate to interpret them this way.164 
Tax law should look to the underlying reasoning in insurance cases de- 
cided on public policy considerations. A case that explicitly overrules or 
upholds policy language based on public policy or economic efficiency 
grounds has much to add to tax law.165 Similarly, when a court or insurance 
practice provides contract terms-either default or mandatory-based on 
policy or efficiency grounds,166 tax law should pay particular heed. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
As discussed in Part 11, insurance law, policy, and practice have a great 
deal to add to the jurisprudence around $9 165 and 213. Practicality alone, 
however, does not empower the courts and IRS to make this shift. As this 
Part will show, the text, history, and structure of these statutes also provide 
ample justification for courts to cite to insurance law or for the IRS to use its 
interpretive power to encourage courts to do so. Finally, this Part observes 
that federal tax law respects and incorporates many elements of various 
areas of state law, and therefore doing so with insurance law, which is 
mostly state law, would not present any challenges. 
- - -- - - - 
160. One's prior year taxes cannot be considered a premium, since the casualty 
loss deduction is available to recent immigrants, newborns, and other new 
taxpayers. 
161. E.g., Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1981). 
162. See generally WILLIAM N.  ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY 8r ELIZABETH 
GARRETT, LEGISLATION A D STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 2006). 
163. Indeed, tax legislation even carries a very strong presumption of constitution- 
ality. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 
(1983); Black v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 505,510 (1977). 
164. See discussion infia Section 1V.D. 
165. E.g., Rosen v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 70 P.3d 351 (Cal. 2003) (upholding 
contract language based on public policy considerations); Strickland v. Gulf 
Life Ins. Co., 242 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. 1978) (striking down based on public policy 
of discouraging unnecessary amputations). 
166. E.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Adler, 309 A.2d 751 (Md. 1973). 
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A. Text 
Most importantly, both sections contemplate an insurance-like role, as 
subsection (a) of both disallows the deduction when "compensated for by 
insurance or o ther~ ise . " '~~  Section 213 explicitly refers to various other types 
of insurance, including private medical insurance and long-term care insur- 
ance.16' Additionally, both use words with strong insurance implications, as 
with 5 165's reference to 
B. History 
Section 165 has an ancient lineage, with its predecessor first appearing 
in the income tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 1867.'~' Later, the Reve- 
nue Act of 1894 added the still-present requirement that the loss not be 
"compensated for by insurance or otherwise."17' As a result of its early ori- 
gins, we have very little substantive history surrounding its original enact- 
ment. Subsequent Congresses have acted consistently to ensure that 5 165 
provides a form of insurance against disaster losses. For example, Congress 
enacted 5 165(i), which allows individuals to carry certain casualty losses 
back one year, in 1962 as a result of the "Ash Wednesday storm" that had 
just devastated the mid-Atlantic states.'72 
We do have legislative history around the passage of 5 213's predeces- 
~ 0 r . l ~ ~  Notably, Congress enacted it during World War 11, which also 
marked the rise of mass employer-provided health in~urance. '~~ The cost of 
war led to extremely high marginal tax rates, running as high as 88%, leav- 
ing only a 12% "~o-pay." '~~ Indeed, the legislative history reads as if Con- 
I.R.C. $5 165(a), 213(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
Id. 5 213(d) (I). 
Id. 5 165(c)(3). 
Revenue Act of 1867, ch. 169,s 13,14 Stat. 478. 
Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 5 28, 28 Stat. 553, invalidated by Pollock v. 
Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). Similar language was used in 
the first act passed after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. Reve- 
nue Act of 1913, ch. 16,s IIB, 38 Stat. 167. 
See 108 CONG. REC. 4146 (1962); see also Pub. L. No. 108-311, 55 408(a)(7)(A), 
(B), 118 Stat. 1166 (2004) (amending 5 165(i)); Pub. L. No. 105-34, 5 giz(a), ill 
Stat. 788 (1997) (amending $165(i)); Internal Revenue Sew., supra note go, at 
"12-14 (discussing the legislative history of 5 165(i)). 
26 U.S.C. 5 23(x) (1946). 
See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical 
Development and Choices for the iggos, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141 (1993). 
Internal Revenue Sew., SO1 Bulletin, tbl. A, at 187-88 (Winter 2oo7), available 
at http://www.irs. gov/pub/irs-soi/o7winbul.pdf. 
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gress had just created universal health insurance: "This allowance is recom- 
mended. . . [to] maintain[] the present high level of public health and mo- 
rale."17'j 
C. Structure 
Much of this Note has addressed the broad structural similarities of 
§ 165 to property insurance and of 5 213 to medical insurance.177 The struc- 
ture of the sections themselves provides further support. For example, 
5 165's enumeration of covered perils, "fire, storm, shipwreck, o r .  . . theft," 
resembles the named perils in most property p01icies.l~~ 
Section 213 similarly covers 'many of the same topics as a health insur- 
ance dealing with the physicians it covers,'80 expenses after 
death,18' and prescription drug ~0verage. l~~ Like most employer-provided 
health plans, it covers dependents and spouses.183 The section also has a 
number of coordinating references with Medicare, the nation's largest 
health insurer.184 
D. Courts or the IRS Can Implement Use of Tax Law 
Insurance law, policy, and practice could be used to interpret $5 165 and 
213 via two methods. First, federal courts hearing tax matters'85 could simply 
start using them to help decide cases. For example, either counsel for the 
IRS or a taxpayer could cite to insurance law in their briefs, and the court 
could use these citations in support of its decision. Given the text, history, 
and structure already noted, courts would have ample justification for doing 
SO. 
- - 
176. Id. at 6. 
177. See also Kaplow, Deductions, supra note 5.  
178. C j  IS0 FORM, supra note 59, at "Section I Perils Insured Against" (enumerat- 
ing perils, including "Fire," "Lightning," "Windstorm," and "Theft," among 
others). 
179. Indeed, it even includes premiums paid for health insurance in the definition 
of deductible medical expenses. I.R.C. 5 213(d)(i)(D) (2000). 
180. Id. 9 213(d) (4). 
181. Id .Qz~(c ) .  
182: Id. $I 213(b). 
183. Id. 92ig(a). 
184. See id. 59 213(d)(l)(D), (d)(4), (dI(7). 
185. Tax matters can come before any federal district court, the federal court of 
claims, the tax court, any circuit court of appeals, and the Supreme Court. 
I.R.C. 55 6213, 7422, 7441, 7482(b) (2000); 28 U.S.C. $5 1295, 1346(a)(1), 
1402(a)(i), 1491 (2000). 
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Second, the IRS itself could use its regulatory pclwers to  bring insurance 
law to bear on  $9 165 and 213, preferably by issuing regulations in 26 C.F.R. 
$5 I-1651-213 under its general rulemaking authority,lS6 or, alternatively, by 
using insurance law to  solve a n  issue presented in a Revenue Ruling. 
The degree of deference given to such regulatory decisions remains un- 
clear. For example, the lower courts and scholars continue to  debate 
whether general-authority Treasury regulations receive deference under the 
ChevronlS7 standard, or the earlier and less-deferential National M ~ l f f l e r ' ~ ~  
standard.ls9 The Seventh Circuit aptly noted, "This seemingly simple in- 
quiry leads us into a free-fire zone of judicial debate over the proper level of 
judicial deference to  various IRS interpretations of the revenue laws."lgO 
Treasury regulations prescribing the use of insurance case law and prac- 
tice should merit deference regardless of which standard courts apply. For 
example, under the less-deferential National Muffler standard, a court will 
look to see if the "regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the stat- 
ute, its origin, and its purpose."191 The previous Sections of this Note, as 
well as Part I1 above, have provided evidence addressing just these f a ~ t 0 r s . l ~ ~  
186. I.R.C. 5 7805(a) (2000) ("the Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe all 
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title"). Note that 
unlike a few Tax Code provisions, such as id. $5 163(i)(5) and 357(d)(3), the 
two sections addressed by this Note do not have clauses specifically authoriz- 
ing the issuance of Treasury regulations. 
187. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(dealing with deference to EPA regulations). 
188. Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979) (dealing 
specifically with deference to Treasury regulations). 
189. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 96 (2006) (en banc) (showing 
how divided the Tax Court remains on this issue). Compare Hosp. Corp. of 
Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 348 F.3d 136, 140-41 (6th Cir. 2003) with 
Snowa v. Comm'r, 123 F.3d igo, 197 (4th Cir. 1997). See generally Kristin E. 
Hickrnan, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Defer- 
ence, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006) (thoroughly reviewing the debate over 
which standard to apply and concluding Chevron to be appropriate). 
190. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F3d 973,977 (7th Cir. 1998). 
191. Nat'l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477. 
192. Since the regulations proposed by this Note have obviously not been promul- 
gated, many of the related National Mufler factors, such as the regulation's 
longevity, reliance, consistency, and congressional scrutiny, cannot be pre- 
dicted. See id. A court could also apply the quite similar standard from 
Skidmore v. Swip e+ Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), which is also less deferential than 
Chevron, and which had its continuing vitality reaffirmed by United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Skidmore focuses on persuasiveness, and the 
arguments in this Note should help persuade. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
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Under the Chevron analysis, since nothing in the Code argues against inter- 
preting §§ 165 and 213 using insurance law, the inquiry moves on to whether 
the agency's interpretation of the statute is a reasonable construction of the 
statute.193 Again, the factors of text, history, and structure, addressed above, 
all weigh strongly in favor of such a regulation being a reasonable construc- 
tion, and hence valid.194 
E. Interaction with State Law 
State regulators oversee private insurance, and insurance law is the 
province of state law. Some might object to federal income tax law taking 
cues from state law. Deferring to the insurance law of the taxpayer's state 
might also result in better or worse treatment than a similarly situated tax- 
payer in a state with different insurance case law, providing additional 
grounds for objection. 
Federal tax law, however, has long deferred in many respects to state 
law. For example, the Supreme Court has held that courts should disallow a 
tax deduction "if allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined 
national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced 
by some governmental declaration thereof."195 The proclamations of a 
state's courts and insurance commissioners certainly merit consideration as 
<c governmental declarations." Similarly, in the landmark case Poe v. 
Seab~rn , '~~  the Supreme Court deferred to Washington state's community 
property law to allow a husband and wife to reduce their tax bill by splitting 
their income,197 despite case law's generally strong tilt against income split- 
t i ~ ~ g . ' ~ ~  
193. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45. 
194. Cf. id. at 848-51 (looking at statutory language, legislative history, and policy 
to determine reasonableness). 
195. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958) (emphasis 
added) (disallowing deduction of overweight truck fines under 5 162, even 
though paying the fines was viewed as ordinary to the trucking business in 
that state); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,591 n.17, 607 
n.1 (1983) (denying tax-exempt status to otherwise clearly exempt educational 
institution based on "national policy to discourage' racial discrimination in 
education"). 
196. 282 U.S. 101 (1930). But see I.R.C. 5 i(a) (2000) (allowing for joint returns, 
effectively extending the benefit of Seaborn to married couples in non- 
community-property states). 
197. Income splitting can provide huge benefits if the recipient is in a lower tax 
bracket. 
198. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1937); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 
(1930) (decided concurrently with Seaborn). 
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Of course, most principles of insurance law have wide acceptance, and 
many factors work to make insurance practice mostly uniform between the 
states.'99 When jurisdictions split on a point, the IRS or the Tax Court could 
simply accept the rule supported by the strongest reasoning. And, even if 
acceptance of a particular insurance principle would benefit some taxpayers 
relative to similarly situated taxpayers in other states, the Supreme Court 
long ago ruled that fully permissible in Seab~rn.~OO 
We live in a time of budgetary constraints, with Congress and the Ad- 
ministration pressing the IRS to collect more revenue but hesitant to  raise 
tax rates.201 This pressure has come along with record budgets for the Ser- 
vice.202 This Part proposes that the IRS boost revenue by borrowing an ap- 
proach long used by private insurers: ~ u b r o ~ a t i o n . ~ ~ ~  While Parts 11,111, and 
IV discussed drawing upon insurance law as precedent for interpreting tax 
law, this proposal goes a step further, showing how viewing these provisions 
as insurance can lead to novel policy proposals. 
A. Subrogation Basics 
Subrogation allows insurers to stand in the shoes of the insured to re- 
cover monies paid out to the insured in those situations where a third- 
parVo4 tortfeasor caused the loss.205 For example, if A runs her car into B, 
199. For example, the IS0 strongly promotes national uniformity in a variety of 
ways. See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text. 
200. Seaborn encouraged several states to move to community property, until 
Congress simply extended the benefits of Seaborn to married couples in 
common-law states in 1948 with the introduction of the joint return. See supra 
note 196. 
201. See Tom Herman, How to Avoid Getting Audited-IRS Ramps Up Scrutiny of 
High-Income Groups; Red-Flag Deductions, WALL ST. J., Apr, 7, 2007, at Bi  
("Pressured by Congress to collect more money, the Internal Revenue Service 
has been busy boosting its audits."); Tom Herman, Pressure Mounts to Crack 
Down on Those Not Filing Tax Returns, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25,2007, at Dg. 
202. Tom Herman, Congress Set To Eliminate Loophole on Some Long-Term Capital 
Gains, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14,2007, at D2 (Bush administration proposes record 
$11.1 billion budget for IRS to increase revenues). 
203. Subrogation is not limited to insurance law, playing a role in general debtor- 
creditor law. "Subrogation extends to every instance in which one party is re- 
quired to pay a debt for which another is primarily answerable." Nw. Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co. v. Althauser, 750 P.2d n66,1167 (1988) (quotations omitted). 
204. A fundamental principle of insurance subrogation is that the insurer has no 
subrogation rights against the insured. Otherwise, insurance would serve little 
value: paying premiums, then litigating to get them back. For example, this 
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resulting in massive hospital bills, then B's health insurer would have subro- 
gation rights against A for the hospital bills.206 Similarly, if X negligently kills 
18,000 of Ys chickens, and Ys property insurer compensates Y for her loss, 
the insurer can then sue X in tort.207 The insurer can typically bring suit in 
the name of the insured,208 and can often invoke the collateral source rule209 
to keep jurors from knowing that insurance has already compensated the 
loss.210 
Property insurers have long pursued their subrogation rights,211 and 
health insurers have also become particularly aggressive in this area with the 
inexorable increases in  medical costs.212 This trend towards increasing use of 
would render insurance provisions covering damage due to the negligence of 
the taxpayer nugatory. Courts have extended this principle to "implied co- 
insured" such as tenants. See, e.g., Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska Comm'ns, 
623 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 1981). 
205. Note that if an insured were herself to initiate a suit against the tortfeasor, 
then the insurer would have an action against the insured. In this way, subro- 
gation vindicates the principle of indemnity, see Section 1I.D supra, by pre- 
venting the injured party from recovering twice: once from her insurer and 
again by suing the tortfeasor. The Code already guards against this type of 
subrogation problem by disallowing the deduction if "compensated for by in- 
surance or otherwise." I.R.C. $$ 165(a), 213(a) (2000) (emphasis added). The 
IRS explicitly states that "or otherwise" includes recovery by lawsuit. Treas. 
Reg. 1.165-i(d) (2) (ii) (2006). 
206. Most courts find health insurers have subrogation rights. See, e,g., Int'l 
Underwriters, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 449 A.2d 197 (Del. 1982); 
Canfora v. Coast Hotels & Casinos, Inc., 121 P3d 599 (Nev. 2005). 
207. Facts directly from Insurance Co. of N. America. v. Cease Electric, Inc., 688 
N.W.2d 462 (Wis. 2004). 
208. Jurisdictions vary on this. See generally STEMPEL, supra note 50, 5 11.04 
(discussing party naming rules and subrogation structuring). 
210. Many tort reform advocates have pushed for reforming the collateral source 
rule. See NAT'L ASS'N OF MUT. INS. COS., COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE RE- 
FORM, http:llurww.namic.org/reports/tortReform/CollateralSourceRde.asp 
(last visited Dec. 112,2007) (listing the progress of reform). 
211. See, e.g., Mason v. Sainsbury (1782), 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (K.B.). 
212. See, e.5, BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF SOUTH CAROLINA, UNDERSTANDING 
YOUR BENEFITS AND CONTROLLING HEALTHCARE COSTS, http:llurww.south- 
caroliablues.com/bcbs/bcbs~img.nsf/(WebFiles)/benefit~coordination~broch 
.pdf/$FILE/benefit-coordination-broch.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2007) 
("Bluecross uses workers' compensation and subrogation to ensure your 
healthcare bills for an injury or illness caused by someone else are paid cor- 
rectly. Our efforts help contain healthcare costs by reducing premium dollars 
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subrogation applies even to government-run full insurance programs such 
as Medicaid.'13 Since the IRS provides partial insurance through $5 165 and 
213, it could also pursue subrogation rights against tortfeasors who cause 
deductible losses or medical expenses. Specifically, it could aim to recover 
the amount of tax revenue lost directly because of the deduction taken by 
the tort victim. 
B. Benefits of Allowing the IRS To Pursue Subrogation 
This proposal would most obviously allow the federal government to 
raise additional revenue directly from tortfeasors. In doing so, it would also 
further the tort law goals of deterrence and accountability, much as private 
insurers' subrogation does.'14 The IRS has substantial experience practicing 
before various courts on matters not directly related to tax law, suggesting it 
could competently take advantage of the opportunity to pursue subroga- 
tion.'15 Moreover, it has extremely effective collection tools not available to 
private parties.'16 
Other economic considerations often lead tort victims not to pursue 
their possible causes of action. For example, a business will often not pursue 
a lawsuit when injured by the negligence of an important customer, sup- 
plier, or partner. In such circumstances, the parties may reach an informal 
agreement, and shove much of the loss onto the federal government via 
5 165. Giving the IRS subrogation rights would discourage such agreements. 
In the extreme, two taxpayers might even collude to get a loss deduction, a 
form of moral hazard combated by subrogation.'17 
paid by you and/or your employer."); see also Theo Francis, House Bill Provi- 
sion May Help Insurers Recover Medical Costs, WALL ST. J., June 8,2006, at D2; 
4 Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Sews., 547 U.S. 356 (2006) (allowing subrogation 
under ERISA). 
213. C j  Arkansas Dept. of Health & Human Svcs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006) 
(limiting Medicaid subrogation rights to amount of medical damages). 
214. See STEMPEL, supra note 50,$11.03 (listing rationales for subrogation). 
215. For example, the IRS is a regular litigant in bankruptcy courts. E.g., Begier v. 
IRS, 496 U.S. 53 (1990) (examining bankruptcy liquidation of airline, with re- 
sult turning on issues of trust law). 
216. E.g., I.R.C. $5 6320-27 (2000) (tax liens). The IRS naturally has extensive 
experience enforcing these liens and dealing with competing liens. Cf: In re 
Walter, 45 F.jd 1023 (6th Cir. 1995). 
217. Michael Sean Quinn, Subrogation, Restitution, and Indemnity: The Law of 
Subrogation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1361,1372 (1996) (reviewing CHARLES MITCHELL, 
SUBROGATION, RESTITUTION, A D INDEMNITY: THE LAW OF SUBROGATION 
(1994)) (" [S] ound public policy requires that there be subrogation in the law 
of insurance. . . . The absence of subrogation would create a powerful moral 
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C. Implementation of IRS Subrogation 
When taking 5 165 deductions, taxpayers currently must fill out a 
form2'' listing each property damaged, along with insurance information, 
date acquired, and fair market values. It would not be difficult to require 
brief information about the cause, of the loss. This information would allow 
the IRS to perform a quick cost-benefit analysis and decide whether to pur- 
sue its subrogation rights. The IRS could similarly require basic itemization 
with 5 213 deductions. 
A thornier problem arises with statutory authorization. In the absence 
of explicit authorizing legislation, the IRS could pursue subrogation sup- 
ported by two theories. First, it could issue regulations giving itself the 
power to pursue subrogation rights and hope that courts find these regula- 
tions worthy of the relevant level of deferen~e.~" Second, the IRS could 
simply claim equitable subrogation rights. There are two types of subroga- 
tion: equitable and contractual.220 Most insurance policies have explicit 
subrogation clauses, so most insurance subrogation is contractual.221 Even 
in the absence of such terms, courts typically give the insurer equitable sub- 
rogation rights, based solely in equity, rather than contractual terms or a 
statute.222 The IRS could similarly seek equitable subrogation for its losses 
due to 5 165. 
Regardless of which of the two approaches the IRS took, courts would 
likely hesitate to find a subrogation right in a reasonable interpretation of 
the statute223 or to find the equities pointing towards subrogation. In effect, 
the IRS would be attempting to create a new cause of action for itself. Real- 
istically, subrogation would probably require congressional authorization, 
hazard. . . . In the absence of subrogation, people would be tempted to con- 
spire to perform actions which appear to be torts."). 
218. I.R.S. Form 4684 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/ 
f4684.pdf. 
219. See discussion supra Section 1V.D. 
220. See STEMPEL, supra note 50,$11.02. 
221. These can often detail particular aspects of the subrogation relationship, such 
as the duty to do certain paperwork and cooperate. E.g., IS0 FORM, supra 
note 59, at "Sections I and I1 Conditions" 5 F. 
222. E.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co., 57 Cal. Rptr. 492 
(Cd. App. 2d 1967); First Nat'l Bank of Columbus v. Hansen, 267 N.W.2d 367 
(Wis. 1978). 
223. Courts' Chevron decisions are unpredictable and often based on ideological 
policy preferences. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make 
Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
823 (2006). 
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which could also address procedural details such as venue, notice, available 
defenses, the effect of contractual waivers,224 and the deductibility of a tort- 
feasor's payments to a prevailing IRS.225 The budgetary constraints of mod- 
ern governing and the Treasury's influence over the lawmaking process put 
congressional action well within the realm of possibility. 
Once the IRS sues a tortfeasor to recover lost revenue, the victim will 
probably often join the lawsuit to vindicate her full rights.226 At this point, 
the IRS could simply leave the suit. Should the victim recover, the taxpayer 
would lose the deduction, thereby restoring the Treasury to the same posi- 
tion as if it had won on its Indeed, the IRS's filing suit could provide 
a reluctant plaintiff with "cover" to pursue the tortfeasor; alternatively, the 
taxpayer might avoid taking the deduction at all to avoid having the IRS file 
suit against a key supplier or customer. Either way, the Treasury and the 
average taxpayer benefit. 
Insurance law and policy have developed over centuries at the hands of 
innumerable judges, legislators, and regulators. The practices of the insur- 
ance industry have emerged from the input of these government actors, as 
well as from scholars, consumer groups, and data on literally hundreds of 
millions of policies. Insurance case law provides well-reasoned, policy- 
oriented resolutions to a wide variety of situations and problems in the tax 
context. In interpreting and implementing the partial insurance programs 
of $9 165 and 213, the IRS and the federal courts have much to gain from 
looking to insurance law for precedent and guidance. 
224. Cf. Great N. Oil Co. v. St. Paul Fire 8 Marine Ins. Co., 189 N.W.2d 404 
(Minn. 1971) (honoring exculpatory waiver by insured, thereby defeating the 
insurer's subrogation rights). 
225. Allowing the tortfeasor to deduct the amounts collected by the IRS wodd 
blunt the value of the subrogation rights to the Treasury, as the recovery 
would be measured in after-tax dollars. 
226. In much the same way, disallowing deductions for insured losses for which 
the taxpayer does not submit a claim has encouraged taxpayers to seek com- 
pensation from insurance. Cf: I.R.C. 5 165(h) (4) (E) (2000). 
227. The tax code, via marginal tax rates and deduction rules, already determines 
the portion of the victim's recovery that the IRS can collect. As a result, nei- 
ther the IRS nor Congress needs to consider which subrogator-subrogee allo- 
cation method to use. Cf: STEMPEL, supra note 50, 4 11.04 (listing the three 
most prevalent allocation formulas), 
